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Notes
THE WHEELS ON THE BUS GO 'ROUND AND
'ROUND: ADDRESSING THE NEED TO
PROVIDE GREATER LATITUDE TO LAW
ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS IN THE PUBLIC
TRANSPORTATION SETTING
While the federal government tightens security on airplanes,
U.S. buses and trains have become inviting targets for
terrorism ....
I. INTRODUCTION
Paul is a passenger on a commercial bus, traveling across the
country.2 He steps from the bus during a short layover and, while away,
police officers board the bus. The officers move down the aisle, feeling
the outside of luggage. As Paul reboards the bus, the officers are holding
a bag, asking each passenger if he or she owns the bag. When Paul
acknowledges ownership, the officers ask him for permission to open the
bag and inspect its contents. At this point, Paul is faced with a dilemma.
He knows that there are no weapons or contraband in the luggage, but,
at the same time, he does not want total strangers poking through the
personal belongings contained within the bag.
Assume for the moment that Paul denies the officers' request and,
rather than respecting his wishes, the officers shrug their shoulders and
proceed to open the bag. Upon a search of its contents, all they locate of
interest is a bag of sugar. The officers then might apologize and return
the bag or, if they are suspicious, they might conduct further
investigation to satisfy themselves that the contents of the apparent
sugar bag is not, in fact, a controlled substance.
I S. Hoffman & J. Kiamzon, U.S. Buses, Trains Called Targets for Terrorists // Multiple-entry
Points, No Guardsare Invitationfor Disaster,LANCASTER NEW ERA, Feb. 20,1998, at A3.
2 Although the two scenarios which follow are based loosely on the experiences of the
passengers in United States v. McDonald, 100 F.3d 1320 (7th Cir. 1996), and United States v.
Nicholson, 144 F.3d 632 (10th Cir. 1998), they are purely hypothetical. They are useful for
stimulating thought on the perplexing problem of balancing the competing interests of an
individual's privacy rights and the government's interest in effective law enforcement.
They are created from the author's imagination and are not intended to reflect any one
person or case.
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Next, consider a situation in which Christina is traveling across the
country as a passenger on a commercial bus with her spouse and two
small children. After a short layover, the family returns to the bus to
find police officers holding luggage. The officers are asking the
passenger who owns the luggage to come forward. The baggage does
not belong to Christina or anyone in her family, so they sit quietly.
When none of the other passengers claim the luggage, the officers open
the bag and find several fully loaded handguns, additional ammunition,
and a substantial quantity of cocaine.
Reflecting on these two hypothetical scenarios, it is likely that Paul
and Christina feel much differently about the officers' actions, even
though the actions are substantially similar in both cases. In the first
scenario, it is likely that Paul feels that his privacy rights have been
violated. The personal belongings that he placed inside the bag were
exposed to the prying eyes of law enforcement officers. In fact, if
familiar with the terminology of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, Paul
would likely feel that the officers' actions constituted an unreasonable
search and, therefore, are a violation of the Fourth Amendment. On the
other hand, in the second scenario, it is likely that Christina and her
family are more willing to have their bags probed and opened, if
necessary, to insure that any illegal contraband and dangerous weapons
on the bus are discovered by law enforcement officers in a timely
fashion. In that case, Christina's desire for security and safety would
likely trump her concern for individual privacy.
Although hypothetical, these scenarios are helpful in demonstrating
one of the tensions inherent in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
Namely, courts must determine the appropriate balance between the
need for effective law enforcement and the individual's right to privacy.
This Note addresses that issue as it applies to public transportation on
buses, trains, and similar modes of transportation. The importance of
this examination grows stronger as it becomes more clear that buses and
other forms of public transportation are increasingly being recognized as
conduits for drug trafficking.3 Law enforcement efforts to stem this
growing tide of drug traffic have increased; but, as a result, a split in the
federal circuit courts has recently developed over how the courts should

3 See, e.g., John Beauge, Philly, Williamsport Officials Aim to Clamp Doum
HARRISBURG PATRIOT & EVENING NEWS, April 2,1998, at B04.
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approach the issue of warrantless searches in the context of public
4
transportation, such as buses.
This Note proposes an approach for courts to use when dealing with
this issue. Before reaching that approach, however, this Note suggests
that, in determining when Fourth Amendment analysis is appropriate, it
is helpful5 to rely on the commonly understood definition of the word
"search". Then, given that definition, law enforcement officers should
be allowed to conduct a limited search of passenger luggage if they can
articulate a generalized suspicion focused on, for example, one bus or
group of buses.6 This will strike an appropriate middle ground between
the lack of suspicion that is acceptable to search luggage in an airport
setting and the probable cause that is necessary in an automobile setting.
This Note will begin by presenting a brief background of the Fourth
Amendment's guarantee against unreasonable searches. 7 The next
Section will examine existing Fourth Amendment jurisprudence as it is
applied to transportation scenarios. In particular, this Note will focus
attention on the exception to Fourth Amendment strictures in the airport
context, at one extreme, 8 and the probable cause requirement in the
automobile context at the other.9 Section I will take a closer look at the
approach utilized thus far in the federal circuit courts with regard to

Specifically, United States v. McDonald, 100 F.3d 1320 (7th Cir. 1996), and United States v.
Nicholson, 144 F.3d 632 (10th Cir. 1998), present divergent views on whether such law
enforcement efforts are appropriate. The Seventh Circuit has allowed the activity by
declaring that it is not a search. McDonald, 100 F.3d at 1327. The Tenth Circuit, however,
feels that the activity is a search in violation of the Fourth Amendment's guarantee against
unreasonable searches and seizures. Nicholson, 144 F.3d at 639. It is necessary to note here
that the Supreme Court's decision in Floridav. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991), apparently is not
controlling. In that case, the question before the Court was whether or not the officers had
unconstitutionally "seized" the passengers on the bus. Id. This Note, like the courts in
McDonaldand Nicholson, is concerned with whether the officers "searched" the passengers'
luggage.
5 Webster's Dictionary defines "search" as to "go through and examine carefully;
explore.., probe.., penetrate." NEW AMERICAN WEBSTER HANDY COLLEGE DICTIONARY
4

475 (1981).

6 This search would allow officers to conduct pat-down, probing searches of the outside
of luggage stored in overhead storage racks. The type of search being described is
demonstrated by the activities of the officers in McDonald, see infra notes 75-102 and
accompanying text, and Nicholson, see infra notes 103-115 and accompanying text.
7 See infra notes 17-45 and accompanying text.
1 See infra notes 48-59 and accompanying text.
9 See infra notes 60-71 and accompanying text.
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searches in other public transportation circumstances.1 0 Finally, in
Section IV, this Note will propose a different approach than the one
implemented thus far in federal appellate cases. Rather than deal with
the question of an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy, courts
should concede that a search is involved, and focus on whether an
exception should apply to the strictures of the Fourth Amendment. 1
This Note suggests that, in the case of public transportation, courts
should adopt a middle ground rule between the airport-type exception 12
and the probable cause requirement,13 permitting United States v.
McDonald"-type searches when officers have reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity on a bus, train, or other similar mode of transportation,
or a group of such modes of transportation. This rule would provide
greater uniformity by resolving the circuit split, as well as provide a
better check on police action by supplying a bright line test for courts to
apply when determining if an officer's actions violate Fourth
Amendment guarantees.
II. BACKGROUND

Before moving to a critique of, and proposed alternative to, the
reasonable expectation of privacy analysis, it is helpful to gain a brief
understanding of the history of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in
order to lay the framework for later analysis. Therefore, this Note will
first examine the Fourth Amendment's guarantee against unreasonable
searches and seizures.15 This, then, will be followed by a look at existing
Fourth Amendment application in certain transportation settings. 16
A. Fourth Amendment GuaranteeAgainst UnreasonableSearches and Seizures
The Fourth Amendment's 17 protection against an unreasonable
search is a uniquely American right that developed as a result of the
I0 See, e.g., United States v. McDonald, 100 F3d 1320 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct.

2423 (1997); United States v. Nicholson, 144 F.3d 632 (10th Cir. 1998). See infra notes 73-115

and accompanying text.
11 See infra notes 116-147 and accompanying text.
12 See infra notes 48-59 and accompanying text.
13 See infra notes 60-71 and accompanying text.
100 F.3d 1320 (7th Cir. 1996).
Is See infra notes 17-45 and accompanying text.
'4

16 Specifically, attention will be paid to the airport setting, as well as searches of
automobiles. See infra notes 46-71 and accompanying text.
17 The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
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colonists' struggles with British power.1 8
Before passage of the
Amendment, general searches were standard in the colonies. 19 General
warrants permitted these searches for purposes ranging from regulating
alcohol consumption and mandating observance of the Sabbath to
insuring the adequacy of corn supplies and settling contested timber
rights. 20 However, the colonies, led by Massachusetts, gradually began
to disfavor use of the general warrant. 21 It was not until the 1780s,
though, that a number of the states finally ended most uses of the
general warrant. 22 While the approach of state law moved gradually to
specific warrants, the states imposed a much stricter requirement on the
federal government and in a more rapid fashion.2 3 Therefore, by the
time the Fourth Amendment was adopted, search and seizure at the
24
federal level had already been significantly restricted.

violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
18 See JACOB W. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT 19 (1966).
19 See Tracey Maclin, The Complexity of the Fourth Amendment: A HistoricalReview, 77 B.U. L.
REV. 925,939 (1997) ("Prior to 1760, general, promiscuous intrusion by government officials
provided the standard method of search and seizure in colonial America.").
20 Id. at 939-41 (discussing the wide-ranging applications and purposes of colonial
warrants in the various colonies and noting that all of the colonies allowed some form of
warantless search and seizure as well).
21 Id. at 941-43.
Colonial attitudes toward general intrusions began to harden in the
mid-eighteenth century at Massachusetts Bay, the first colony to
"fathom[] the full implications of specificity in warrants and
translate[ ] them into legislation and practice ..." Massachusetts thus
became the first jurisdiction to embrace the specific warrant as the
conventional method of search and seizure.
Massachusetts'
transformation from general searches to specific warrants occurred
slowly, and not by happenstance. The specific warrant emerged
"because of events, especially political events, that were peculiar to
[Massachusetts]." In particular, two controversies in the 1750s that
involved violent, general searches against crucial political groups
elicited an unprecedented legislative reaction against general searches,
leading to the development of the specific warrant. The first was the
proposed Excise Act of 1754; the second was the public opposition
generated by customs officers undertaking to conduct searches ex
officio and by writs of assistance.
Id.
22 Id. at 948.
23 Id. at 949. In fact, "[b]y one means or another, a total of four states had deprived the
national authority of general warrants before the the [sic) Fourth Amendment did so." Id.
24 Macin, supra note 19, at 949. Specifically, Professor Madin notes that "[t]he Fourth
Amendment therefore 'inherited a tradition in which the ambit of federal search and
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In passing the Fourth Amendment, the Framers were attempting to
address several primary concerns. Among these concerns were the
desire for a justification of probable cause before a search or seizure
occurred, the desire to particularize searches and seizures to thereby
restrict their scope, and the desire to provide independent methods, such
25
as judicial review, to enforce the limits placed on searches and seizures.
With these justifications as a starting point, Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence expanded, at varying rates, after the Amendment's
passage. While the case law surrounding this area alone can, and does,
fill volumes, this Note will narrow the discussion to a few decisions in
which the Supreme Court has reflected on, and further defined, the
purposes of the Fourth Amendment.

seizure was already tighter than that of the states." Id. It would seem, therefore, that the
States recognized early on the dangers of allowing officers the ability to search and seize
based only on the authority of a general warrant. For that reason, the need for instituting
safeguards, like requiring that warrants be more specific when issued, was recognized and
implemented. Before proceeding, definitions of terms "search" and "seizure" for the
purposes of the Fourth Amendment would be helpful, as Black's Law Dictionary explains
them. A search is "[a]n examination of a person's house or other buildings or premises, or
of his person, or of his vehicle, aircraft, etc., with a view to the discovery of contraband or
illicit or stolen property, or some evidence of guilt to be used in the prosecution of a
criminal action...." BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY 1349 (6th ed. 1990). Further, an
"unreasonable search" is defined as a search that is "without authority of law." Id. at 1350.
A seizure of an individual is defined as "the taking of one physically or constructively into
custody and detaining him, thus causing a deprivation of his freedom in a significant way,
with real interruption of his liberty of movement." Id. at 1359.
25 See Morgan Cloud, Searching Through History; Searching For History, 63 U. CHI. L. REV.
1707, 1731 (1996). Professor Cloud feels that "to fail to distinguish between specific and
general warrants, and the corollary differences between general and specific searches
without a warrant, is to simply miss one of the important historical developments in the
years preceding the ratification of the Fourth Amendment." Id.
The Fourth Amendment defines general warrants as unreasonable, but
it also defines specific warrants as reasonable. This is a distinction that
makes a difference. A specific warrant may have provided a defense
to a lawsuit [brought against an officer who conducted a search of an
individual's home or person], but it was not inconsistent with the
Framer's primary concerns.
Id.
Professor Cloud notes that those "primary concerns were to ensure that searches and
seizures would be justified by probable cause, to restrict their scope with the requirement
of particularity, and to enforce these limits with various mechanisms, including
independent judicial review." Id.
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For example, in Johnson v. United States,26 the Supreme Court pointed
out that the Fourth Amendment's purpose is to allow the individual's
right of privacy to be trumped by the right to search only when an
independent judicial officer deems it appropriate.2 Further, in 1985,
Justice White, writing for the Court, noted that "the underlying
command of the Fourth Amendment is always that searches and seizures
be reasonable." 28 While these general statements about the purposes of
the Fourth Amendment seem relatively straightforward, commentators
have recognized a disagreement about the relationship between the two
29
clauses in the Amendment.

331 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948) (discussing the limits of federal officers' ability to conduct
warrantless searches of defendant's hotel room based on their suspicions that defendant
was violating federal narcotics laws).
27 Id. "The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous
officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which
reasonable men draw from evidence." Id. Rather, "[ilts protection consists in requiring
that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being
judged by the officer engaged in the competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime .... " Id
In this way, "[w]hen the right of privacy must reasonably yield to the right of search is, as a
rule, to be decided by a judicial officer, not by a policeman or government enforcement
agent." Id.
28 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337 (1985). Previous to this observation by Justice
White, in 1979, the Supreme Court stated:
The essential purpose of the proscriptions in the Fourth Amendment is
to impose a standard of "reasonableness" upon the exercise of
discretion by government officials, including law enforcement agents,
in order "to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against
arbitrary invasions...." Thus, the permissibility of a particular law
enforcement practice is judged by balancing its intrusion on the
individual's Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of
legitimate governmental interests. Implemented in this manner, the
reasonableness standard usually requires, at a minimum, that the facts
upon which an intrusion is based be capable of measurement against
"an objective standard," whether this be probable cause or a less
stringent test. In those situations in which the balance of interests
precludes insistence upon "some quantum of individualized
suspicion," other safeguards are generally relied upon to assure that
the individual's reasonable expectation of privacy is not "subject to the
discretion of the official in the field."
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648,653-55 (1979).
29 See, e.g., Thomas K. Clancy, The Role of Individualized Suspicion In Assessing the
Reasonableness of Searches and Seizures, 25 U. MEM. L REV. 483, 488 (1995). The first clause
contains the guarantee that "[tihe right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated .... "
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The second clause indicates that "no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." Id
26
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In summary, the first clause guarantees that the individual will be
free from unreasonable searches and seizures, and the second indicates
the procedures for obtaining a warrant. 30 Of the two primary points of
view that have emerged, one advocates that the second clause exists to
interpret the first. 31 In other words, the only type of search that is not
unreasonable is one that is conducted under the procedural safeguards
contained within the second clause. 32 Therefore, only in exceptional
circumstances would an officer be allowed to act without first obtaining
a warrant.33
The second primary point of view posits that the two clauses are
separate and distinct. 34 The first clause would therefore only require that
searches be reasonable, while the second would focus only on the
searches that are conducted under the authority of warrants. 35 Under
this theory, the Fourth Amendment does not mandate the use of
warrants; it only indicates the conditions that warrants must meet in
order to be valid. 36
Rather than select one of these particular views to espouse, however,
the Supreme Court has continued to maintain that the overriding
concern is that searches be reasonable. 37 Specifically, the modem Court
has held that an individual's "reasonable expectation of privacy" plays a
key role in determining whether a search has taken place.3 8 In the

3o U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
31 See generally James J. Tomkovicz,

California v. Acevedo: The Walls Close in on the Warrant
Requirement, 29 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1103 (1992).
32 See Clancy, supra note 29, at 518; LANDYNSKI, supra note 18, at 42.
33 See Clancy, supra note 29, at 519; see also Silas J. Wasserstrom, The Incredible Shrinking
Fourth Amendment, 21 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 257, 290, 294 (1984). Among the most prominent
advocates of this view of the Fourth Amendment was Supreme Court Justice Felix
Frankfurter, as seen in his dissenting opinion in United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 6970 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). See also Clancy, supra note 29, at 520.
34 See Clancy, supra note 29, at 521; see generally Tomkovicz, supra note 31.
35 See Clancy, supra note 29, at 521-22.
36 Id. at 522 (citing Joseph D. Grano, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment Warrant Requirement,
19 AM. CRIM. I REv. 603, 639 (1982)). One of the most prominent proponents of this
viewpoint is Chief Justice Rehnquist, who has written that "[t]he terms of the Amendment
simply mandate that the people be secure from unreasonable searches and seizures, and
that any warrants which may issue shall only issue upon probable cause." Id. (quoting
Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 438 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), overrued by
United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982)).
3
See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
38 This approach to Fourth Amendment jurisprudence can be traced back to Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). For further discussion on Katz, see infra note 74 and
accompanying text.
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landmark decision of Katz v. United States,39 Justice Harlan, in his
concurring opinion, indicated that defining an individual's reasonable
expectation of privacy is a two-step process that involves that person's
subjective expectation of privacy, as well as whether society is willing to
objectively view that expectation as reasonable. 4°
Further, while insisting on reasonableness, the Court has indicated
that the concept of reasonableness cannot be precisely defined or
mechanically applied. 41 As such, the right to be free from unreasonable
search and seizure must be shaped by the context in which it is
asserted. 42 Generally, however, it is assumed that, in order to withstand
judicial scrutiny, a search must either be authorized by a warrant or be
based on probable cause. 43 If a search has not been conducted pursuant
to a warrant or does not fit under one of a myriad of exceptions, the
evidence obtained has been recovered in violation of the Fourth
Amendment, making it subject to exclusion. 44

-

389 U.S. 347 (1967).
Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). "Before the [F]ourth [Almendment applies to a search
and seizure, a person must, first, 'have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of
privacy and, second, that.. . expectation [must] be one that society is prepared to recognize
as reasonable."' State v. Kelly, 678 P.2d 60 (Idaho Ct. App. 1984) (citing Katz v. United
States, 789 U.S. 347,361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
41 See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520,559 (1979). In Bell, the Court noted that reasonableness
"requires a balancing of the need for the particular search against the invasion of personal
rights that the search entails. Courts must consider the scope of the particular intrusion,
the manner in which it is conducted, the justification for initiating it, and the place in which
it is conducted." Id.
4 See Clancy, supra note 29, at 525; Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 318 (1971) (quoting
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968)); see also New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337 (1985)
(noting that reasonableness "depends on the context within which a search takes place").
4 See Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 310-11 (1959) (discussing that warrantless
searches must be based on probable cause). Specifically, the Court in Drapernoted:
The crucial question for us then is whether knowledge of the related
facts and circumstances gave... "probable cause" within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment... to believe that petitioner had committed
or was committing a violation of the narcotic laws. If it did, the arrest
[and the search], though without a warrant, was lawful ....
Id. at 310.
The exclusionary rule was first introduced by the Supreme Court in Weeks v. United
States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914). Then, in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), the Supreme
Court held that the Fourth Amendment was applicable to the States through the
Fourteenth Amendment, but also held that the exclusionary rule was not applicable to the
States. Wolf, 338 U.S. at 27-28, 33. Finally, in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), the Court
extended the exclusionary rule to state courts. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655. Specifically, the
Court held that any evidence that is the fruit of a search or seizure in violation of the
United States Constitution is, "by that same authority, inadmissible in a state court ....
40
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While the intricacies of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence are quite
complex, it is sufficient for purposes of this Note to focus on a few
general rules. If no search takes place, the Fourth Amendment is not
implicated. If a search occurs, however, it must first and foremost be
reasonable. Generally, searches must be supported by a warrant or
probable cause unless another exception can be found that justifies the
actions of the law enforcement officer. One such exception, as will be
seen in the following section, is a search of an individual in the airport
context. If, however, the law enforcement officer is unable to justify the
search through any of these methods, that search will be deemed
unreasonable, and the evidentiary fruit it yields will be excluded from
any resulting prosecution. Thus, with this general background on the
Fourth Amendment's guarantee against unreasonable searches and
seizures, attention will now be directed to the existing application of
Fourth Amendment search and seizure law in the context of both airport
and automobile searches. 45
B. Existing Fourth Amendment Application to Transportation
While it is beyond the scope of this Note to adequately and
exhaustively cover all of the existing case law and commentary on
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence with regard to transportation, a brief
look is nevertheless instructive. Once it is determined that specific
government action constitutes a search, the question becomes one of the

Since the Fourth Amendment's right of privacy has been declared enforceable against the
States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth, it is enforceable against them by
the same sanction of exclusion as is used against the Federal Government." Id.
4
The author readily admits that this general background of Fourth Amendment history is
cursory, at best. As one scholar notes, however, "[n]o history of a topic as broad as the
origins of the constitutional rules governing searches and seizures could ever be factually
complete in an absolute sense." See Cloud, supra note 25, at 1708. Indeed, an exhaustive
examination of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence was not the intent of the preceding
section. Rather, the goal was to acquaint the reader with the general requirement of
"reasonableness" that the Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized. In addition, it is
helpful to note that this area is hardly well-defined, and that commentators, and even the
Court itself, is often unclear about the precise meaning of the Fourth Amendment and its
proper application. Any attempt at resolving such issues here would inevitably distract
from the true purpose of the Note, which is to suggest that law enforcement officers should
be allowed to conduct limited searches on buses, and the like, if they can articulate a
generalized suspicion about a bus, or other similar mode of transportation, or a group of
such vehicles. In order to make such an argument, it is necessary that McDonald-type
searches, as will be later defined, be viewed as "searches" under the Fourth Amendment.
In order to facilitate such a finding, for purposes of this Note only, the author suggests
simplifying Fourth Amendment analysis in the public transportation setting by defining
"search" as it is commonly understood.
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justification of that search. As noted earlier, the general rule in this area
is that such a search must be authorized by a warrant, or be based on
probable cause.46 Continuous modifications of the warrant requirement
have taken place, however, as multiple exceptions are recognized and
applied by the courts. 47 The exception to the warrant requirement
applied in the airport setting is of particular significance here.48 While
electronic screening of luggage in an airport is understood to be a search
under the Fourth Amendment, 49 courts have routinely allowed such
searches of carry-on luggage without a warrant. 5°
Typical of the type of searches ruled constitutional under this
exception is the one performed upon Mary Patricia Clay in early 1980 at
the Orlando International Airport.sl After sending her shoulder bag
through the X-ray scan machine prior to boarding her plane, a security

See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
In his concurrence in Californiav. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991), Justice Scalia comments
on this very phenomenon:
Even before today's decision, the "warrant requirement" had become
so riddled with exceptions that it was basically unrecognizable. In
1985, one commentator catalogued nearly 20 such exceptions,
including "searches incident to arrest... automobile searches...
border searches... administrative searches of regulated businesses...
exigent circumstances... search[es] incident to nonarrest when there
is probable cause to arrest... boat boarding for document checks...
welfare searches.., inventory searches... airport searches... school
search[es] ....
" Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83
MICH. L. REV. 1468, 1473-1474.... Since then, we have added at least
two more. Californiav. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1985) (searches of mobile
homes); O'Connorv. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987) (searches of offices of
government employees).
Our intricate body of law regarding
"reasonable expectation of privacy" has been developed largely as a
means of creating these exceptions, enabling a search to be
denominated not a Fourth Amendment "search" and therefore not
subject to the general warrant requirement.
Id. at 582-83 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).
48 See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 910-12 (9th Cir. 1973) (holding that a
screening search at airports is not unreasonable under Fourth Amendment analysis as the
individual is not required to submit to the search, but rather remains free to leave at any
time).
49 United States v. Epperson, 454 F.2d 769,770 (4th Cir. 1972).
50 See, e.g., Davis, 482 F.2d at 893. For the reasoning of one court that allowed such a
search, see infra note 57. The exception, however, is most readily applied to carry-on
luggage only. The presence of an exception for checked luggage is not as dear. See, e.g.,
United States v. Palazzo, 488 F.2d 942 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Cyzewski, 484 F.2d
509 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Allen, 349 F.Supp. 749 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
51 See United States v. Clay, 638 F.2d 889 (5th Cir. 1981).
46

47
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52
officer detained Clay after noticing an unidentifiable object in her bag.
After receiving Clay's permission, the officer opened the bag and began
to search through it.5 Unable to locate the object, the officer then opened
a manila envelope that was found inside the bag, without Clay's
consent.54 Inside the envelope the officer found a quantity of cocaine. 5
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals refused to suppress the evidence,
holding that the officer's actions did not constitute an unreasonable
search.56 Specifically, the court found that a passenger, as well as carryon luggage, may be searched on mere suspicion, even if that suspicion is
unsupported.7

This approach by the Fifth Circuit has generally been the approach
taken by most courts when dealing with the question of searches in an
airport setting.5 8 In other words, courts are generally quite liberal in

53

Id. at 890-91.
Id. at 891.

54

Id.

s Id.
6

Clay, 638 F.2d at 892.

Id. The court held that "[tihose who actually present themselves for boarding on an air
carrier... are subject to a search based on mere or unsupported suspicion ...[and that
standard] is equally applicable to a search of a passenger's carryon luggage at the security
checkpoint." Id. In reaching its conclusion, the court relied on an earlier decision in United
States v. Skipwith, 482 F.2d 1272 (5th Cir. 1973).
In ascertaining the standard applicable to the search in Skipwith, the
court balanced the competing interest of public necessity of airport
security, "efficacy of the search, and degree of intrusion" against the
"degree and nature of the intrusion into the privacy of the person" and
the effects the search has on citizens. The court concluded that "the
standards for initiating a search of a person at the boarding gate
should be no more stringent than those applied in border crossing
situations ..." Turning to the facts of the case under consideration,
Clay presented herself at the security checkpoint for boarding, where
she knew or should have known that her carryon articles were subject
to search ....[T]he fact that the x-ray scan machine indicated Clay's
shoulder bag contained an unidentifiable dark object created sufficient
suspicion to justify a complete physical search of the luggage until the
object was positively identified as harmless.
Clay, 638 F.2d at 892 (citations omitted).
The Clay court also quoted United States v. Cyzewski, 484 F.2d 509 (5th Cir. 1973), noting that
a "search may continue until the law enforcement official satisfies himself that no harm
would come from the passenger's boarding the plane." Id.
5 See, e.g., United States v. Freeland, 562 F.2d 383,385 (6th Cir. 1977) (noting that the court
did "not believe that all searches of passengers' luggage at airports are invariably subject to
the proscription of the Fourth Amendment"); United States v. Albarado, 495 F.2d 799, 806
(2d Cir. 1974). The court found:
57
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allowing warrantless searches in the context of a passenger's luggage at
an airport.59 Providing contrast to this approach, however, is the stricter
approach taken by courts when defining the extent to which law
enforcement personnel should be allowed to conduct the search of an
automobile.
Under the stricter approach, 60 courts require that a police officer
have probable cause before conducting a warrantless search of an
automobile. 61 Therefore, interestingly, even in the context of an
automobile search, there has been an exception applied to the warrant

[TIhat the use of a magnetometer is a reasonable search despite the
small number of weapons detected in the course of a large number of
searches .... The absolutely minimal invasion in all respects of a
passengers' privacy weighed against the great threat to hundreds of
persons if a hijacker is able to proceed to the plane undetected is
determinative of the reasonableness of the search.
Id.
See United States v. Brown, 508 F.2d 427 (8th Cir. 1974) (allowing the search of a passengers
"flight bag"); United States v. Dalpiaz, 494 F.2d 374, 376 (6th Cir. 1974). The court stated:
The basis for upholding such searches is that a person who proceeds to
attempt to board a plane in the face of widespread publicity about the
problem of air piracy and specific airport notices concerning the
security measures which are employed to detect potential hijackers
consents to this limited search.
Id.
See also United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1973) (finding that searches of
passengers and their carry-on luggage is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment).
59 See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
60 This approach is demonstrated in cases such as Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132
(1925), and its progeny. For further discussion of Carroll, see infra notes 63-71 and
accompanying text.
61 Probable cause regarding arrest, search, and seizure is defined as "[r]easonable grounds
for belief that a person should be... searched. Probable cause exists where the facts and
circumstances would warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe that an offense was
or is being committed ....[M]ere suspicion or belief, unsupported by facts or
circumstances, is insufficient." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 627-28 (5th ed. 1983). The
Supreme Court has also weighed in on the definition of probable cause. For example, in
1996, the Court indicated:
Articulating precisely what... "probable cause" mean[s] is not
possible .... [It is a] commonsense, nontechnical conception[ ] that
deal[s] with "'the factual and practical considerations of everyday life
on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act ....
"
As such, the standards are "not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a
neat set of legal rules."
Omelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690,695-96 (1996).
The Court noted that it has found "probable cause to search as existing where the known
facts and circumstances are sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable prudence in the belief
that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found." Id. at 696.

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1999

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 34, No. 1 [1999], Art. 4

182 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34
requirement when probable cause can be shown. 62 This exception, which
the Supreme Court calls the automobile exception, is known as the
CarrollDoctrine6 3 because it had its origins in the 1925 decision of Carroll
v. United States.64
In Carroll,6s the defendants were stopped by federal prohibition
agents while carrying liquor in their automobile.66 The agents had
probable cause to believe that the defendants were in possession of the
liquor and did indeed locate it upon a search of the vehicle. 67 The
defendants, however, argued that the search was in violation of the
Fourth Amendment.68 The Court disagreed, holding that a warrantless
search and seizure is valid if made with probable cause. 69 In other
words, if the search was made "upon a belief, reasonably arising out of
circumstances known to the seizing officer, that an automobile or other
vehicle contains that which by law is subject to seizure and destruction,
the search and seizure are vald."7°
The Carroll doctrine, or the "automobile exception" as it is more
commonly known, has established that although a warrantless search of
an automobile may be conducted, it must be supported by probable
cause. 71 In this way, the requirements of a search in that context are

See, e.g., California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 582 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in
judgment); 3 CHARLEs ALAN WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 668 (2d ed.
62

1982).
WRIGHT, supra note 62, at § 668.
6 267 U.S. 132 (1925); see also WRIGHT, supra note 62, at § 668 (citing Carroll v. United
63

States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925)).
65 Carroll,267 U.S. at 132.
66 Id. at 135-36.
67 Id.
68 Id. at 138-40.
69 Id. at 149.

70 Carroll, 267 U.S. at 149. Thus, the Carroll doctrine, at its core, indicates that "a
warrantless search of an automobile can be made 'whenever there is (1) probable cause to
believe that the automobile contains evidence of crime and (2) an exigency arising out of
the imminent or likely disappearance of the automobile.'" WRIGHT, supra note 62, at § 668.
(quoting Charles E. Moylan, Jr., The Automobile Exception: What It Is and What It Is Not-A
Rationale in Search of a ClearerLabel, 27 MERCER L. REv. 987,1011-12 (1976)).
71 See Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970);
United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559 (1927); United States v. Berkwitt, 619 F.2d 649 (7th Cir.
1980); United States v. Matthews, 615 F.2d 1279 (10th Cir. 1980); United States v. Bryant,
580 F.2d 812 (5th Cir. 1978). The Court based the Carroll doctrine on the danger that the
mobility inherent in automobiles presents to effective law enforcement. Carroll,267 U.S. at
153. Although various cases have examined the Carroll doctrine since its inception, the
1925 decision still stands as good law. Therefore, whenever a police officer has probable
cause that crime-connected items are in a vehicle, that officer may search the vehicle
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significantly more stringent than in the context of an airport where
neither probable cause nor individualized suspicion is required. Further,
while the airport and the automobile are only two of the potential
settings for Fourth Amendment questions and the cursory examination
of these two approaches is hardly exhaustive, they will serve as an
appropriate foundation for analyzing two recent cases that have caused a
split in the federal circuit courts over the question of unreasonable
searches on a bus.7 These two cases will provide the backdrop for this
Note's proposed method of addressing the ability of law enforcement
officers to fight crime on buses, trains, and other similar modes of
transportation.
III. Two DIFFERING APPROACHES TO FOURTH AMENDMENT

APPLICATION

IN

THE BUS SETING

In approaching the question of Fourth Amendment application in
public transportation settings other than airplanes and automobiles, two
relatively recent federal circuit courts of appeal decisions deal with the
issue of searches, or the lack thereof, on buses. 3 These cases present
divergent views on whether the patting down of bus passengers' carryon luggage constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment. In
neither case was the officers' actions supported by probable cause or a
warrant. These two circuits felt differently about whether the officers
should be allowed to conduct such a search. Given this conflict, it seems
clear that a different approach to the issue might yield a more consistent
result. The final part of this Section will further attempt to illustrate this
point by critiquing the law's current focus on an individual's reasonable
expectation of privacy. 74

without a warrant. The geography of the search extends to wherever the probable cause
can be said to reach to. Further, when the Court decided Acevedo, it added that even if an
officer's suspicion only extends to containers located within a car, and not the entire car,
the officer may search that container. California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565,576 (1991).
72 A bus provides an interesting setting for this issue as it presents neither the security
concerns of an airport, nor the privacy concerns of an automobile.
73 See United States v. Nicholson, 144 F.3d 632 (10th Cir. 1998); United States v. McDonald,
100 F.3d 1320 (7th Cir. 1996).
74 See infra notes 116-124 and accompanying text. Before proceeding with an examination
of McDonald and Nicholson, however, it is necessary to briefly examine the concept of
reasonable expectation of privacy and how it is used by the courts to define when an
officer's actions constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment. In 1967, the Supreme
Court decided Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). It is from this case that the Court's
reasonable expectation of privacy analysis was spawned. The Court noted that among the
factors to be considered in determining if a search has occurred is the location of the
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A. United States v. McDonald
The first of the two cases that this Note will use to provide the
framework for later analysis is United States v. McDonald,7 5 which
originated in the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. In February of 1994,
as a response to concerns about drug trafficking on company buses and
at bus depots, Greyhound Bus officials in Indianapolis, Indiana,
contacted the city's police department for help. 76 Three department
police officers were subsequently assigned to drug interdiction at the
Indianapolis Greyhound bus depot.77
On the 15th of that month, a bus from St. Louis, Missouri, arrived in
Indianapolis for a short layover.78 After the passengers disembarked,
police officers sought and obtained permission from the driver to inspect
the bus.79 At no point, however, did the officers seek or obtain a warrant
for their activities.80 Upon boarding the bus, the three officers walked
down the aisle, feeling the outside of the luggage located in the overhead
storage racks, as well as smelling the air around the bags.81 During this
probe, one of the officers discovered two bags that she suspected
contained controlled substances.8 2 After another officer confirmed this

activity in question, the nature of the intrusion, whether the individual acted as if privacy
was expected, and an objective evaluation of when a reasonable person would expect
privacy. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 351-62. The Court indicated that "[w]hat a person knowingly
exposes to the public... is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what he
seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be
constitutionally protected .. " Id. (citations omitted). At that point, "once it is recognized
that the Fourth Amendment protects people - and not simply 'areas' - against
unreasonable searches and seizures, it becomes clear that the reach of that Amendment
cannot turn upon the presence or absence of a physical intrusion into any given enclosure."
Id. at 353.
75 100 F.3d 1320 (7th Cir. 1996).
76 Id. at 1322.
Id. Specifically, the Greyhound officials requested that the officers be alert for drug
activity they suspected was taking place in the depot, as well as the surrounding area. Id.
at 1322 n.1.
78 Id. at 1322.
79 Id.
80 McDonald, 100 F.3d at 1322.
81 Id. The officers themselves smelled the air around the bags, rather than employing a
canine sniff. Id.
2 Based on her training, and twenty-two years of experience, Detective Cotton testified
that the bags felt as if they contained "bricks" of cocaine, or some other form of narcotic.
Id. at 1322 n.2.
77
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assessment, the officers waited until the passengers reboarded the bus
before proceeding with the investigation.83
4
Upon returning to the bus, Lashawn McDonald sat near the bags.8
Although she denied ownership, another passenger later told the officers
that McDonald had brought the two bags aboard the bus.8 Before being
advised of this, however, the officers sought and received the driver's
permission to open the bags.86 They sought this permission, as the bags
appeared to be abandoned, based on the fact that no passenger would
claim them.87 Upon opening the luggage, the officers discovered that the
bags contained several bricks of cocaine.8 8

Upon being indicted, McDonald filed a motion to suppress, arguing
that the officers' actions constituted an unlawful search that violated the
Fourth Amendment. 89 After the district court denied the motion to

93

84
95

86

Id. at 1322-23.
Id. at 1323.
McDonald, 100 F.3d at 1323.

Id.

Id. The court went to some length in explaining the details of the passengers' denial of
ownership.
After identifying herself as a police officer, Officer Cotton spoke with
two female passengers sitting in close proximity to the suspect luggage
and asked if either of them owned the identified bags on the overhead
rack. Each of them individually denied ownership of the luggage.
Detective Cotton next approached McDonald, who was sitting in front
of the two female passengers with whom she had just spoken,
identified herself as a police officer, pointed to the two suspect luggage
bags, and asked her if either of the two bags belonged to her.
McDonald responded that they did not. Cotton then addressed all
nine passengers on the bus collectively and asked if any of them
claimed ownership of the bags. No passenger claimed ownership.
Cotton then removed the bags from the luggage rack... held them
above her head, and again asked, "Do these bags belong to anyone on
the bus?" Once more, there was no response. She repeated this
inquiry two more times, each time receiving no response.
Id.
The officers were later told by one of the other passengers that he had watched McDonald
carry the luggage in question on board the bus. Id. While the court spent some time
addressing the question of whether McDonald's actions constituted abandonment of the
bags, that analysis will not be examined here, as it does not bear on the topic of this Note.
8 Id.
8 Id. After holding a hearing on the defendant's motion, the district court found that the
actions of the police officers did not constitute an unreasonable search under the Fourth
Amendment. Id. After her motion to suppress was denied, the defendant pled guilty to
the charge of possession, with intent to distribute, cocaine. Id. The plea agreement that she
entered into gave the defendant the right to appeal the district court's denial of her motion
87
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dismiss 9° and McDonald appealed, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the
lower court's decision, holding that the police officer's touching of the
bags did not constitute a search under Fourth Amendment analysis. 91
Therefore, the Seventh Circuit found that there was no violation of the
Fourth Amendment. 92
The court's reasoning stemmed from its examination of the concept
of reasonable expectation of privacy.93 Noting that McDonald knew that
by placing her baggage in the overhead rack other passengers could
come into contact with it, the court found that she had no reasonable
expectation of privacy that her bags would not be touched by others.9 If
McDonald had no reasonable expectation of privacy, then no search
occurred that would trigger Fourth Amendment analysis.

to suppress, but, in return, she waived the right to appeal her conviction and sentence. Id.
at 1322.
After hearing the defendant's testimony admitting the elements of the
offense, the district court accepted McDonald's plea and found her
guilty of the crime charged. The court sentenced the defendant to 120
months imprisonment, to be followed by five years of supervised
release, and imposed a special assessment fee of $50.
Id. at 1324.
9 See United States v. McDonald, 855 F. Supp. 267,269 (S.D. Ind. 1994).
91 McDonald, 100 F.3d at 1327.
92 Id.
93 Id. The court stated:
Given the unfortunate realities of today's world, where law
enforcement authorities must combat a steady influx of illicit drugs, as
well as guard against possible terrorist incidents accomplished with

devices ranging from simple handguns to sophisticated bombs, it is
not surprising that over the last few decades our society has accepted
increased security measures (e.g., hand-held metal detectors used to
scan one's torso) at many locations such as airports, courthouses,
hospitals, and even schools. In light of these realities, we agree with
other courts of appeal that have held that the reasonable expectation of
privacy inherent in the contents of luggage is not compromised by a
police officer's physical touching of the exterior of luggage left exposed
in the overhead rack of a bus.
Id. at 1325 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).
94 Id. at 1326. The court felt that McDonald had "knowingly and voluntarily exposed the
exterior of her bags to being physically touched by other persons. In other words, she did
not have a reasonable expectation of privacy that the exterior of her luggage would not be
felt, handled, or manipulated by others." Id. (emphasis in original). Other circuits have
also addressed this question, and held that the manipulation of the outside of luggage by
police officers does not violate the reasonable privacy interests of the owners of the
luggage. See infra note 97. For a brief explanation of the concept of an individual's
reasonable expectation of privacy, see supra note 73 and accompanying text.
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The Seventh Circuit also supported its decision by analogizing the
police officer's examination of the luggage compartment to canine sniffs
of luggage, which the United States Supreme Court had addressed in
United States v. Place.95 In Place, the Supreme Court held that a canine
sniff of luggage did not constitute a search under the Fourth
Amendment. 6 The Seventh Circuit noted that the officers in McDonald,
like the canines in Place, did not have to open the baggage during their
examination.9
Therefore, the officers' actions did not constitute a
search. 98 In addition to this analogy to canine sniffs, the court based it
holding that the officers' actions did not constitute a search under the
Fourth Amendment primarily on its determination that McDonald did
not have a reasonable expectation of privacy that the exterior of her
luggage would not be touched.9
When dealing with similar issues, other courts have taken an
approach comparable to the Seventh Circuit's approach. 100 In direct
conflict with the Seventh Circuit, however, the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals found in United States v. Nicholsonl11 that, on facts similar to
McDonald, the officers' actions did constitute an unreasonable search in
violation of the Fourth Amendment. 102

-

462 U.S. 696 (1983).

96 Id. at 707.

McDonald, 100 F.3d at 1325-26 n.7. Specifically, the court found that "[slimilar to a
canine sniff, a police officer's touching and feeling of luggage does not require opening the
baggage or inspecting its contents. Thus, the information gleaned from such action is
limited." Id. The court then pointed out that in performing a canine sniff, police officers
would most likely be forced to manipulate the luggage being examined in order to make it
available to the canine. Id. "Because the Supreme Court has approved the canine sniff, it
follows that the Court would also likely approve some degree of police handling and
manipulation of personal luggage in order to make the luggage accessible to the police
dog." Id.
98 Id. at 1327.
99 Id. at 1326.
100See United States v. Guzman, 75 F.3d 1090 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that an officer's
touching of the defendant's luggage, while it was located in an overhead storage rack on a
bus, was not an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment); United States v.
Lovell, 849 F.2d 910 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding that border patrol guard's removal of luggage
from a conveyor belt in order to compress the sides of it, as well as sniff the luggage, was
not a search under the Fourth Amendment); United States v. Viera, 644 F.2d 509 (5th Cir.
1981) (holding that a police officer lightly pressing the outside of a suitcase does not
constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment). As can be seen in each of these cases,
the courts ruled that an individual's privacy interests are not violated by the manipulation
of the exterior of luggage. McDonald, 100 F.3d at 1326.
10I 144 F.3d 632 (10th Cir. 1998).
9

102 Id.

at 640.
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B. United States v. Nicholson
The factual background of Nicholson is actually quite similar to that
of McDonald. Several detectives from the Oklahoma City Police
Department's Drug Interdiction Unit inspected luggage on a Greyhound
bus during its temporary stop in Oklahoma City. 10 3
When the
passengers departed for a short layover, two officers began inspecting
luggage in the cargo hold, while two others boarded the bus to inspect
10 4
carry-on luggage on the overhead racks.
The detectives testified that they would remove the luggage from the
overhead racks while manipulating and smelling them in the process. 10 5
During their examination, the detectives found a bag in which they felt
"tightly-wrapped bundles" that they suspected contained illegal
drugs. 10 6 After replacing the luggage, the detectives waited until the
passengers reboarded the bus and watched as the defendant sat
underneath the bag.107 After the passengers all denied ownership of the
luggage, the detectives inspected the contents of the bag and discovered
that it contained approximately five kilograms of cocaine. 10 8

103

Id. at 634.

-D4
Id.

While the results of the cargo hold inspection potentially pose a more difficult
question, examination of the case will be restricted to the results of the carry-on luggage
inspection.
10s Id. at 635.
106Nicholson, 144 F.3d at 635. "Detectives Leach and Arragon entered the passenger area of
the bus and began removing bags from the overhead racks. Detective Leach testified that
'[dluring the course of removing the bags from the overhead racks... they are
manipulated and smelled....'" Id. One of these detectives testified that "he felt hard,
'tightly-wrapped bundles' inside an unidentified black carry-on bag, which led him to
believe the bag might contain illegal drugs." Id. Interestingly,
[allthough Detective Leach testified that he generally smelled carry-on
bags after removing them from the overhead rack, he did not testify
that he actually smelled Defendant's carry-on bag, or that his
suspicions were aroused by the bag's scent. After manipulating the
carry-on bag Detective Leach placed it back in the overhead rack.
Id.
107 Id.

MoId. "After Detectives Wenthold and Leach had checked the identity of each passenger,
the black carry-on bag remained unclaimed. Detective Leach retrieved the bag from the
overhead rack, held it above his head, and asked if anyone on the bus owned the bag. No
one responded...." Id. At that point, "[t]he detectives ... removed both bags from the
bus to inspect their contents. Outside the bus, the detectives opened both bags. Inside the
black carry-on bag the detectives found five gray duct-taped bundles each containing
approximately one kilogram of cocaine." Id.
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Nicholson subsequently stipulated to ownership of the luggage in
order to challenge the actions of the detectives.1 9 The district court
followed McDonald and found that the defendant's motion to suppress
should not be granted because the officers did not violate Nicholson's
reasonable expectation of privacy. 110 Therefore, the district court found
there was no violation of the Fourth Amendment.1 11
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, however, disagreed. 12 The
court acknowledged that placing the luggage on the overhead rack
exposed it to some manipulation, but not the kind of inspection that the
detectives used in discovering the cocaine. 113 The court felt that the
detectives' actions exceeded what a bus passenger would reasonably
expect with regard to manipulation of luggage. 114 Thus, the Tenth
Circuit concluded that the detectives had violated Nicholson's
reasonable expectation of privacy and that their manipulation of the bag
constituted an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment. 15
Therefore, although the Tenth Circuit reached a different result than
the Seventh Circuit in McDonald, the Tenth Circuit, like the Seventh
Circuit, focused on the passenger's reasonable expectation of privacy in
determining whether a Fourth Amendment search had occurred. This
Note will now briefly discuss why this prevailing focus on an
individual's reasonable expectation of privacy is not as helpful as simply
using the commonly understood definition of the word "search." This

109Id. By stipulating to ownership of the luggage, Nicholson was able to gain the standing
requisite to challenging the officers' actions as violative of the Fourth Amendment. Id.
110Id. at 639.
111 Nicholson, 144 F.3d at 639.

Id.
Id. The court sought to distinguish its holding here from the one in United States v.
Gault, 92 F.3d 990 (10th Cir. 1996). In Gault, an officer kicked and lifted a bag on the floor of
a train, which was partly extended into the aisle. Gault, 92 F.3d at 991. The court reasoned
that the information "obtained from the kick and lift of the bag, its weight and the solidity
of its contents, was the same information that a passenger would have obtained by kicking
the bag accidentally or by lifting it to clear the aisle." Id. at 992.
112
113

114 Nicholson, 144 F.3d at 639.
115 Id. Specifically, the court

reasoned that, "[wie believe that by handling Defendant's
carry-on bag in this manner, Detective Leach departed from the type of handling a
commercial bus passenger would reasonably expect his baggage to be subjected, and
entered the domain protected by the Fourth Amendment." Id. Therefore, "[w]hen
Detective Leach removed Defendant's carry-on bag from the overhead rack and conducted
a 'tactile examination ... aimed at discovering the nature of the contents of the bag,' he
violated Defendant's reasonable expectation of privacy in the bag." Id. (citations omitted).
In this way, the detectives' actions, as they relate to the handling of Nicholson's bag, were a
search under the Fourth Amendment. Id.
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Note will then argue that courts should recognize a search is taking place
and apply a standard, in this type of situation, that allows a search if the
law enforcement officers can demonstrate generalized suspicion.

C. Critiqueof Focus on Individual'sReasonable Expectationof Privacy
As noted earlier, the current approach in determining whether a
search has occurred involves, as Katz suggested, an examination of an
individual's reasonable expectation of privacy. 116 As one scholar
explains, the reasonable expectation of privacy approach to Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence is flawed, as it requires courts to either
conclude out of hand that the expectations are unreasonable, or offer
reasonable support for the legitimacy of those expectations. 117 Placing
the concept of privacy at the core of Fourth Amendment analysis has
clearly produced unforeseen, and often unacceptable, results.118 At the
116See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
117Bruce G.Berner, The Supreme Court and the Fall of the Fourth Amendment, 25 VAL. U. L.
REV. 383, 394 (1991). Professor Berner elaborated on an article written-by another scholar,
Anthony Amsterdam, which laid the framework for his approach. See Anthony G.
Amsterdam, Perspectives On The Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L.REV. 349 (1974). In
criticizing the "reasonable expectation of privacy" approach to Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence, Professor Amsterdam argues:
An actual subjective expectation of privacy obviously has no place in a
statement of what Katz held or in a theory of what the [Flourth
[A]mendment protects. It can neither add to, nor can its absence
detract from, an individual's claim to [Flourth [Almendment
protection. If it could, the government could diminish each person's
subjective expectation of privacy merely by announcing half-hourly on
television that... [George Orwell's 1984 police state] was being
(instituted]... and that we were all forthwith being placed under
comprehensive electronic surveillance.
Id. at 384.
118Scott E. Sundby, "Everyman"'s Fourth Amendment: Privacy or Mutual Trust Between

Government and Citizen?, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 1751, 1756 (1994). Professor Sundby explains:
The Court's embracing of the "right to be let alone" as the animating
principle of the Fourth Amendment thus changed the nature of the
Court's analysis in a most fundamental way by making privacy the
lodestar for determining how and when the Amendment applied. But,
intriguingly, a value that clearly was meant to liberate the Amendment
from wooden categorizations of Fourth Amendment interests also
turned out to contain the seeds for the later contraction of Fourth
Amendment rights. For what ultimately emerged was an Amendment
that was privacy-bound, rising or falling in both scope and protection
based upon how the notion of privacy fared inthe Court and within
society as a whole. And with the benefit of hindsight, a number of
factors can now be identified that help explain why a Fourth
Amendment founded almost exclusively upon the principle of privacy
is in decline.
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most basic level, it is difficult to quantify just exactly what an
individual's expectation of privacy is in any given situation. Each
person, if asked, would likely define his expectation of privacy
differently from any other given person, based upon his own individual
upbringing, life experience, and a variety of other contributing factors. If
it is indeed difficult to pin down exactly what comprises any individual's
reasonable expectation of privacy and where the limits to that
individual's reasonableness are to be found, courts will invariably find
themselves attempting to superimpose their own grasp of what the
public feels is reasonable on any given defendant. The futility of such an
exercise is demonstrated by the approach taken by various courts when
they attempt to analyze what the general public, or the reasonable
person in like or similar circumstances, would expect by way of
privacy. 119
Yet, another reason that makes the determination of an individual's
reasonable expectation of privacy so difficult stems from the realities of
modem life. The distinction between what is considered public and

Id. at 1757-58. Professor Sundby then proceeds to discuss many of these factors.
19 See, e.g., Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445,449-50 (1989); State v. Kelly, 678 P.2d 60 (Idaho Ct.
App. 1984); Commonwealth v. Busfield, 363 A.2d 1227,1229 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1976). In Riley,
the defendant was growing marijuana inside a greenhouse in his backyard. Riley, 488 U.S.
at 44849. The police, acting on a tip, flew over the defendant's backyard in a helicopter,
and were able to spot the marijuana through a hole in the roof of the greenhouse. Id. The
Supreme Court noted that any member of the general public could have legally flown over
the defendant's backyard and spotted the marijuana growing in his greenhouse. Id. at 451.
As the police officer did no more than that, the Court held that Riley had no reasonable
expectation of privacy in his greenhouse, and therefore there was no search in violation of
the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 451-52. In Kelly, the defendant owned rural property, and
was growing marijuana on it. Kelly, 678 P.2d at 64. Acting on a tip, police officers drove
out to the property, and standing at Kelly's fence line were able to look onto his property
and see the marijuana plants. Id. The court held:
It is clear that Kelly could have no reasonable expectation that
members of the public would not walk along the highway right-ofway and look onto his property. This is no more than the officers did
when they identified the plants as marijuana. The observation of
marijuana was thus not a search prohibited by the [Flourth
[A]mendment.
Id. at 65.
In Busfield, officers were able to see through the window of the defendant's house, which
was covered only by a sheer curtain, and observe several men, a set of scales, marijuana,
and related paraphernalia. Busfield, 363 A.2d at 1227-28. The court held that the defendant
forfeited any reasonable expectation of privacy he might have expected in his home by his
own activities. id. at 1229. "It is patently unreasonable to assume one expects privacy
when he shields himself only by a sheer curtain, easily seen through, when the means to
insure privacy in the form of a window blind is available to him." Id.
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what is considered private is becoming increasingly less clear as a result
of modem technology. 120 Thus, determining what an individual's
"reasonable expectation of privacy" actually is, and the limits to which it
121
extends, has become increasingly difficult.

As one commentator notes, the concept of privacy has various
potential meanings. 122 These differing meanings seem to make it
difficult to accurately quantify what an individual's reasonable
expectation of privacy is in any given situation. While the Katz analysis
includes both the subjective, individual's expectation and the society's
reasonable expectation, quantifying a reasonable expectation of privacy
is still apparently difficult. The obvious question, therefore, is what, if
anything, provides a better solution to determining when the Fourth
Amendment's strictures should be applied.
One potential solution is to avoid the reasonable expectation of
privacy inquiry altogether and simply determine if the activities
undertaken by law enforcement qualify as a "search," as that word is

12 Sundby, supra note 118, at 1758.
Technological and communication advances mean that much of
everyday life is now recorded by someone somewhere, whether it be
credit records, banking records, phone records, tax records, or even
what videos we rent. We may want to be left alone, but we
realistically do not expect it to happen in any complete sense.
Id. at 1758-59 (footnotes omitted).
121 Id. at 1761.
122William J. Stuntz, Privacy's Problem and the Law of Criminal Procedure,93 MICH. L. REv.
1016, 1020-21 (1995). Stuntz goes on to single out two kinds of privacy that he feels are the
most important in the criminal procedure context.
The first is fairly definite: privacy interests as interests in keeping
information and activities secret from the government. The focus here
is on what government officials can see and hear, what they can find
out. The paradigmatic infringement of this kind of privacy is the act of
reading someone's correspondence or listening to her telephone
conversations, or perhaps rummaging through her bedroom closet.
The second kind of privacy is much harder to get one's hands on: it is
easier to say what it is not than what it is. It is not, other than
coincidentally, about protecting secrets and information. Rather, it is
about preventing invasions of dignitary interests, as when a police
officer publicly accosts someone and treats him as a suspect. Arrests
or street stops infringe privacy in this sense because they stigmatize
the individual, single him out, and deprive him of freedom.
Id. at 1021.
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commonly defined. 173 The simplicity of this approach is undoubtedly
helpful in addressing the current question of whether the activities of the
officers in McDonald and Nicholson violated the safeguards of the Fourth
Amendment. 124
By simply determining if the commonly understood definition of a
search has been met, courts can avoid the seemingly impossible question
of whether a person's reasonable expectation of privacy is violated by an
officer's actions. Next, Section IV will employ that analysis to determine
if the type of activity involved in McDonald and Nicholson constitutes a
search. This will then provide an alternative framework for determining
if the officers' actions in those cases were constitutional under the Fourth
Amendment.
IV. APPLICATION OF A MIDDLE GROUND RULE

Before addressing the question of how courts should deal with
problems like those encountered in McDonald and Nicholson, this Section
will first examine whether the Fourth Amendment is applicable. As
determined above, however, rather than approach this question from the
standpoint of "reasonable expectation of privacy," this Note will ask
whether the officer's actions constituted a "search," as that word is
commonly understood. 13 The Section will then propose the adoption of
123Webster's dictionary defines "search" as to "go through and examine carefully;

explore... probe... penetrate". NEW AMERICAN WEBSTER HANDY COLLEGE DICIONARY
475 (1981). See also supra note S. Professor Berner seems to favor this approach:
Rather than define the activity in terms of the interest (a search is
anything that intrudes on a reasonable expectation of privacy) or the
interest in terms of activity (the [Flourth [A]mendment protects those
places we want free from intrusion), [Professor Berner proposes] that
we define the governmental activity in its own terms-that we take the
word 'search' to mean what it means.
Berner, supra note 117, at 398. He then goes on to define "search" by noting that "to search
is physically to seek, through any of the senses, for a governmental purpose, including, of
course, crime detection." Id.
124 An exhaustive examination of the feasibility of this alternative is certainly beyond the
scope of this Note, but because of the simplicity it provides, it will be adopted here.
125 It is appropriate at this point to indicate that this Note does not presume to suggest an
abandonment of many years of Katz reasonable expectation of privacy analysis and
jurisprudence. Rather, it is attempting to point out that the difficulty of becoming mired
down in struggling to discern what the extent of a person's reasonable expectation of
privacy is can be simplified by resorting to the commonly understood definition of the
word "search." In this way, rather than join the Seventh and Tenth Circuits in arguing over
whether the bus passengers had a reasonable expectation of privacy, this Note can proceed
to its thesis, which is that officers should be allowed to conduct the type of activities carried
on in McDonaldand Nicholson, without a warrant or probable cause, as long as they have a
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a middle-ground rule, found between the test for searches in an airport
setting and automobile searches, that should be applied to buses, trains,
and other similar modes of transportation. Lastly, this Section will
conclude with a discussion of the advantages of such an approach.
Given the factual circumstances of both McDonald and Nicholson, it is
clear that the police officers were involved in exploring, probing, and
examining the luggage.1 26 At this point it is important to remember that
the dictionary defines "search" as examining carefully, exploring and
probing.127 Therefore, even if not actually opening the baggage, the
actions of the officers satisfy the definition of a search. Although some
will likely dispute this determination, this Note, for the sake of
argument, will deem the type of activity that was conducted a search.
With this determination made, attention can now properly be turned to
the application of the Fourth Amendment when law enforcement officers
board public transportation, such as buses or trains, and conduct patdown searches of luggage, like the searches conducted in McDonald and
Nicholson.
A. Adoption of a Middle-Ground Rule
Although the crime that occurs on buses, trains, and the like
invariably receives significantly less attention than that which occurs on
12
airplanes, the threat posed by such crime is very real nonetheless. 8
Perhaps one reason for this greater focus on crime in the air is the greater
number of innocent lives that are affected. Hundreds of lives are placed
at risk when a plane is hijacked, when explosives are placed on board, or
when other criminal activity occurs on an airplane. The unfortunate
result of such an occurrence, many times, is the loss of all of those

generalized suspicion that a crime has occurred, or is occurring, on that bus, or group of
buses.
126 In McDonald, the court notes that the officers were "pushing and feeling the exterior of
the bags." United States v. McDonald, 100 F.3d 1320,1322 (7th Cir. 1996). In Nicholson, the
officers were engaged in, among other things, feeling the outside of the bags. United States
v. Nicholson, 144 F.3d 632,634 (10th Cir. 1998).
127See supra note
128 As

5.

one example, Chicago recently struggled with concern over passengers' safety on its

buses and trains.
Hopefully there will come a time when CTA riders can travel on the
city's buses and trains at all hours with a comfortable sense of safety.
But we are not there yet. Although violent crime is down, the
perception still exists among many riders that the possibility of trouble

is never far away on a CTA train ....
Editorial, CTA Must Act Now, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Mar. 23,1998, at 25.
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lives. 129 This, then, might serve as a justification for the relaxed approach
to Fourth Amendment application found to exist in the airport setting.
A concern certainly exists about crime in public transportation other
than airplanes; however, such crime does not affect the same number of
lives in any given instance as it does in an airport setting.13 Given this
difference in the number of lives affected, perhaps the most viable
solution is to deny law enforcement officers the latitude given in the
airport context, but still give greater latitude than currently exists when
approaching crime detection and enforcement in other public
transportation settings. Rather than relax the Fourth Amendment
requirements to the point of the airport setting or maintain the strictures
that apply to automobile searches, it seems appropriate to approach the
matter from somewhere in between. In this way, the increased danger
that is posed to the public by utilizing public transportation such as
buses is addressed, without the need to go to the suspicionless search
extreme that is allowed in the airport context. Such an approach would
allow officers to conduct the type of searches undertaken in McDonald
and Nicholson for the purpose of protecting the public without violating
the passengers' constitutional rights.
This type of approach has been utilized in various situations that
have come before the United States Supreme Court. In 1995, the Court
decided Vernonia School District 471 v. Acton.131 Although the case does
not involve transportation, it does present an example of the type of
middle-ground rule proposed here. In Vernonia School District, a student
challenged his school's random urinalysis drug testing of athletes as
being violative of the Fourth Amendment.1 32 The Court held, however,

For example, a bomb that was placed on board a Pan Am jet killed 270 people over
Lockerbie, Scotland. David L.Marcus, Lockerbie Trial Takes a Step Toward Reality Near
Bombing's 10th Anniversary, Libya Says it OK's Netherlands Site, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 16, 1998,
129

at A2.

For examples of articles recognizing this concern, see supra notes 1, 3, 128 and
accompanying text.
131 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
132 Id. at 651. The School District noted that drug use was becoming an increasing problem,
and that student athletes were among the leaders of the drug culture. Id. at 649. As a
result, the school system instituted a policy that required random drug testing of all
athletes. Id. at 650. "The Policy applies to all students participating in interscholastic
athletics. Students wishing to play sports must sign a form consenting to the testing and
must obtain the written consent of their parents. Athletes are tested at the beginning of the
season for their sport." Id. Beyond this generalized testing of each athlete, "once each
week of the season the names of the athletes are placed in a 'pool' from which a student,
with the supervision of two adults, blindly draws the names of 10% of the athletes for
130
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that the school had a significant interest in deterring its students from
the use of drugs, and that the school should not be required to conduct
its search in the "least intrusive" manner possible.133 The Court simply
relied on the requirement of the "reasonableness" of the search. 134
Similarly, in Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 135 the Court
allowed a search mandated by the Federal Railroad Administration
(FRA). 3 6 In that case, the FRA became concerned with the number of
railway accidents, and suspected that alcohol and drug use were
significant contributing factors in many of those accidents.1 37 As a result,
the FRA mandated both blood and urine testing for all railroad
employees.1 38 Railway labor organizations challenged the regulations as
violative of the Fourth Amendment. 139 The Court did find that the
regulations constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment, 14° but
concluded that those searches met the reasonableness requirements
141
given the significant government interest involved.

random testing." Id. One student, James Acton, wanted to play football, but both he and
his parents refused to sign the drug testing consent forms. Id. at 651. When the school
denied him the chance to participate, Acton brought suit. Ld
133Id. at 661, 663. The Court indicated that, 'Itlaking into account all the factors we have
considered above-the decreased expectation of privacy, the relative unobtrusiveness of the
search, and the severity of the need met by the search-we conclude Veronia's Policy is
reasonable and hence constitutional." Id. at 664-65.
04 Id. at 652-53. The Court previously adopted a similar approach in New Jersey v. T.L.O.,
but there, the official who conducted the search had individualized suspicion that the
defendant was involved in wrongdoing. 469 U.S. 325 (1985). The Court in Vernonia School
District,however, further advanced the analysis and found that individualized suspicion is
not required, but that a more generalized suspicion is satisfactory. See Vernonia School
District,515 U.S. at 653-54. The Court stated:
We have upheld suspicionless searches and seizures to conduct drug
testing of railroad personnel involved in train accidents; to conduct
random drug testing of federal customs officers who carry arms or are
involved in drug interdiction; and to maintain automobile checkpoints
looking for illegal immigrants and contraband, and drunk drivers.
Id. at 653-54.
- 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
136 Id.

13

Id. at 606-07.

1 Id. at 609-10.
139 Id.

at 612.

140Skinner, 489 U.S. at 620. The court noted that "[b]ecause it is clear that the collection and

testing of urine intrudes upon expectations of privacy that society has long recognized as
reasonable, the Federal Courts of Appeals have concluded unanimously, and we agree, that
these intrusions must be deemed searches under the Fourth Amendment." id.
141 Id. at 621. The Court stated:
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Although there are other examples of the Court relaxing the Fourth
Amendment's requirements, 142 these two prominent cases serve to
demonstrate the feasibility of a middle ground rule in certain
circumstances. Both Vernonia School District and Skinner demonstrate
that the Court is willing to allow warrantless searches if the government
can make a plausible showing of reasonableness. What remains then is
to point out the reasonableness of allowing officers to conduct the type
of searches that the police undertook in McDonald and Nicholson. Given
the government's legitimate concern in reducing the drug trafficking and
other crime that occurs on public transportation, to strike a middle
ground rule that would allow law enforcement officers to conduct patdown type searches of luggage located in overhead racks on buses,
trains, and the like is clearly appropriate. The officers would be allowed
to conduct such a search when they have a generalized suspicion that
focuses on one bus or train, or upon a group of buses or trains. 143 Such a
solution is appropriate because it admits that a search is taking place;
yet, it does not violate the Fourth Amendment's strictures because such a
search is considered reasonable. 144 In that way, law enforcement officers
would be allowed to better protect the public from crime without
violating a passenger's constitutional rights.

The Government's interest in regulating the conduct of railroad
employees to ensure safety, like its supervision of probationers or
regulated industries, or its operation of a government office, school, or
prison, 'likewise presents special needs beyond normal law
enforcement that may justify departures from the usual warrant and
probable-cause requirements.'
Id.
142See, e.g., Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987) (warrantless search of probationer's

home allowed as it was based on reasonable suspicion); Martinez-Fuerte v. United States,
428 U.S. 543 (1976) (border guards given more latitude in ability to search).
143In McDonald, the Indianapolis Police Department developed generalized suspicion of
the buses passing through the Greyhound Bus Depot when the Greyhound officials
contacted the police department with the company's concerns over the flow of illegal drugs
on its buses. United States v. McDonald, 100 F.3d 1320, 1322 n.1 (7th Cir. 1991). The
Greyhound officials specifically requested that the police watch over the drug activity that
was suspected to be taking place in and through the Indianapolis bus depot. Id. Similarly,
in Nicholson, the officers from the Oklahoma City Police Department's Drug Interdiction
Unit were operating with the permission of Greyhound Bus Officials at the Oklahoma City
depot. United States v. Nicholson, 144 F.3d 632,634 (10th Cir. 1998).
14 Although some readers are likely to contend that this middle ground rule infringes too
greatly on the individual's privacy rights, it is the position of the author that such a limited
infringement is justified by the higher level of security that it provides to those who utilize
public transportation.
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If this middle-ground rule is applied to the introductory
hypotheticals of this Note, it appears that the passengers might be more
willing to accept the officers' actions.
By recognizing that law
enforcement officers have the ability to conduct a limited pat-down
search of their luggage, law-abiding passengers understand that their
protection is better provided for, and that their individual privacy rights
have only been infringed, if at all, in a very limited manner. In that way,
it appears that a proper balance is struck between the government's
legitimate interest in effective law enforcement for public safety and the
individual's right to privacy.
B. Goals Achieved By This Rule
A middle-ground rule achieves several goals. First, it achieves
uniformity throughout the circuits. Currently, with a split over the issue
of whether the activity conducted is even a search, no uniform
application of a consistent principle exists throughout the federal
circuits. The simplicity of the rule proposed allows the courts to move
past the question of whether a search is involved and to spend its
resources attempting to determine if the officers had a generalized
suspicion sufficient to allow the search.
In addition, a significant deterrent effect will result. As it becomes
known that law enforcement officials are able to conduct such searches,
criminals will likely be more reluctant to carry on their illicit activities on
public transportation due to the threat of discovery. 145 Furthermore, not
only would criminals be deterred, but also courts would then possess a
bright line test to apply in determining if an officer's actions violated a
passengers' rights. Specifically, courts could abandon the need to
examine the passengers' reasonable expectation of privacy146 and focus
on whether the officers conducting the search had the requisite
147
generalized suspicion of the bus or train, or group of buses or trains.

145San Francisco is just one example of where this phenomenon has been observed.

"Overall crime on San Francisco's transit system declined by one-third over the past two
years, with assaults plunging 60-percent during the same period ....
Transportation
Director Emilio Cruz said increased police presence and bus inspection programs helped
fuel the decrease." Jason B. Johnson, More Cops, Inspections Have Cut Crime on Muni /
Assaults Dropped 60% Over 2 Years, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., April 1,1998, at A14.
146For discussion of why an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy is hard to
identify or quantify, see supra notes 116-124 and accompanying text.
147It should be noted at this point that this Note is not suggesting that the concept of an
individual's reasonable expectation of privacy should have no place whatsoever in Fourth

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol34/iss1/4

Heck: The Wheels on the Bus Go 'Round and 'Round: Addressing the Need t

1999]

THE WHEELS ON THE BUS

199

V. CONCLUSION

Given the potential pitfalls of adopting an approach that requires an
examination of a passenger's "reasonable expectation of privacy," this
Note did not analyze the type of law enforcement conduct that occurred
in McDonald and Nicholson under that line of jurisprudence. Instead, for
purposes of this Note, it is recognized that the activity being conducted
satisfies the commonly understood definition of the word "search."
Once it is determined that a search has taken place, courts should then
adopt a middle ground rule that strikes the proper balance between the
relaxed approach in the airport setting and the stricter probable cause
approach taken in the automobile setting. Specifically, officers should be
allowed to conduct these "searches" when they can demonstrate a
generalized suspicion of criminal activity that focuses on one bus, train,
or other mode of public transportation, or even a group of those buses,
trains, and the like. This approach will provide for greater uniformity,
deterrence, and a bright line test for use by the courts. Indeed, such a
rule would, as Justice Clark wrote, "give[ ] to the individual no more
than that which the Constitution guarantees him, to the police officer no
less than that to which honest law enforcement is entitled, and, to the
courts, that judicial integrity so necessary in the true administration of

justice."14s

Andrew P. Heck

Amendment analysis. Rather, it is suggesting that a simpler approach to determining
when a search has taken is place is to use the commonly understood definition of the word.
An individual's expectation of privacy, then, would play a role in the court's determination
of whether a search, after having been conducted, was accomplished pursuant to the
strictures and safeguards that the Fourth Amendment requires.
148 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,660 (1961).
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